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Liquid Transformation in the Political Economies of BiH and Kosovo 
 
Draft Paper for TD10 International Studies Association Honolulu March 2005. 
Michael Pugh, University of Plymouth, mpugh@plymouth.ac.uk 
______________________________________________________ 
The transformation dynamics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo rubs salt into the 
war wounds of economically vulnerable sectors of society in a context of fragile political and 
security situations, complex or ambiguous constitutional status and an imprecise and 
contested balance of power between international direction and local ownership. The 
protectors have been imposing a model of economic transformation, ultimately derived from 
the neoliberal economic ideology of aggressive capitalism and the 1989 Washington 
consensus on developmentalism. The inhabitants of war-torn societies have often clung to 
clientism, shadow economic activities and resistance to centrally-audited exchange. This 
paper contends that what is sometimes portrayed as a clash between neoliberal modernity 
and a pre-modern ‘Balkan way’ is questionable in its dyadic assumptions and its 
underestimation of linkages between the spheres of neoliberalism and nationalist–mafia–
clientism. 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
This paper has a dual focus. First it is concerned with the crisis of ‘public squalor and private 
affluence’ (in the phrase popularized by J.K. Galbraith),1 occasioned by the diminishing 
public realm in the post-war political economies of Bosnia and Kosovo. Second, it is 
concerned with the extent to which the shadow economies are criminalized, while externally-
imposed and socially stressful policies have been legitimized. The paper seeks to challenge 
the assumption of many international state-builders that the failures of market-orientated 
reform are a product of pre-modern resistances, rather than a case of neo-liberal policies 
themselves undermining and fragmenting southeast Europe’s social and economic fabric. 
Southeast Europe can be characterized as ‘un-modern’ in that while the shapes of class, 
territory and social order have evidently changed since 1992, identity groups remain highly 
configured.2 Contrary to the process highlighted by the critical theorist Zygmunt Bauman in 
Liquid Modernity (2000), individuals have not been freed from collective constraints, social 
norms or society itself.3 Indeed, collective restraints and social norms have been redefined in 
national terms as protection of, and justice for, the social group, contributing to the diminution 
of the state’s role in determining a just society.  
However, the diminution of the public space in economic, social and political terms 
cannot be understood solely in terms of domestic nationalist-elite opposition to a nascent 
multi-ethnic state. This process has been reinforced and is significantly driven by external 
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direction, in particular the policies pursued by international institutions in the economic 
sphere. Roland Paris maintains that there has been a civilizing mission to protect war-torn 
societies and introduce a ‘liberal peace’ through what I have called an ‘urge to engineer’.4 
The legacy of conflict seems to provide a blank canvas on which war entrepreneurs, 
international administrators and carpetbaggers from outside can introduce a doxa (in 
Bourdieu’s sense of beliefs and practices elevated into such a status that they cannot be 
called into question).5
In addition to Bauman’s version of critical theory, the paper also draws upon work on 
the evolution of capitalist modernity and its relation to warfare as developed by researchers 
associated with the Research Centre for War, Armament and Development, University of 
Hamburg, and the ‘Micropolitics of Armed Groups’ at the Humboldt University, Berlin.6 Their 
methodology has comprised a rich mixture of quantitative recording, categorization and 
comparative analysis of wars (stored in data sets), and theories of war causation (grounded 
in analysis of historical social, political and economic processes). The approach has included 
research on understanding the interactions between social orders and the economic 
structures within war-prone societies.  
Relevant to BiH and Kosovo are the findings that violence in areas of former socialist 
governance is generally a consequence of systemic failures and highly differentiated and 
attenuated modernization – and is accompanied by a reassertion of neo-patrimonial political 
economies. The withdrawal of state functions and economic decline leads 
patrimonial/clientist networks to assert claims against the state and other groups, sometimes 
using ethnicity to mobilize followers into violent conflict.7 The significance for this paper is 
that post-conflict peacebuilding under external, international guidance that addresses only 
economic symptoms of social unrest, such as corruption and crime, overlooks the 
functionalism of clientistic networks for economic survival and social cohesion.8  
 
A coincidence of interest in squeezing public space  
 
In liquid modernisation, the separation of private and public space is increasingly dissolved. 
Public goods and public space are often a stage for creating, preening and demolishing 
celebrities and for projecting private relations and emotions, as a kind of salute to individual 
free expression.9 It implies that Big Brother is no longer watching over ‘society’, but over 
socially autonomous individuals who are watching Big Brother on television. 
From a political economy perspective, public space might be defined as an arena for 
civil society, configured and set aside by the state, in which citizens organize themselves 
collectively for the common good.10 This presupposes a distinction between state and civil 
society communities – though the latter were often state subsidized and furnished with social 
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ownership and legal guarantees of free association. A broader definition allows that through 
social provision, common ownership and direction of economic enterprises the state, notably 
those with liberal welfare- and socialist-oriented governments, could also claim to be 
providing public goods and public space.  Whether defined as the civil society space 
between state and individual, or as a socio-economic function to provide public goods (as 
distinct from private accumulation), public space has been increasingly squeezed by 
corporate privatization for the extraction of profit that emphasises deflationary monetarism, 
privatization and limiting the state’s economic role.11 Even the apparatus of state security is 
increasingly privatized.12 Although presented as a ‘golden rule’ of economic development, 
this agenda is conteste by Massimo Florio, Joseph Stiglitz and others who argue that it has 
less to do with economic rationalism than political ideology and the reflection and 
maintenance of a particular structure of global power.13
The war-torn societies of southeast Europe seem to fit into this picture, though they 
they stand accused of resisting the modern condition, clinging to primordial identities, political 
clientism and forms of economic exchange that brought them into contention with 
globalization and structural adjustment, as well as with each other.14 State budgets have 
typically been plundered by local actors during civil war, and the regulation of finance and 
economic exchange is weak or non-existent. New incentives have been created to enrich the 
individual and impoverish the collective. Collective assets, social property, public utilities, 
government factories, infrastructures and lootable resources are targets and emerge 
depleted or destroyed. Ruling elites are disoriented, captured or catapulted into office to 
continue their wartime exploitation.  
But the transformation of the political economy of public space has also been a 
purposeful strategy of territorial administration and social management by missionaries from 
outside.  In BiH and Kosovo, society has been vulnerable to raids on the public sphere from 
intervenors equipped with a neoliberal agenda of political economy as part of a civilizing 
mission to introduce a ‘liberal peace’ to war-torn societies.15
For example, the Kosovo economy was mapped by the Rambouillet ultimatum where 
the requirement to convert to a free market was inscribed and was subsequently written into 
the framework constitution. UNMIK exercises exclusive control and regulation over economic 
policy and personnel, and over public and socially-owned property and enterprises.16 When 
some members of the UN Security Council, such as Russia, regarded changes to property 
rights as an infringement of sovereignty, the head of the EU pillar, Joly Dixon, retorted that 
UNMIK and not the Security Council would decide the details for administering Kosovo.17 
Development benchmarks were subsequently imposed on Kosovo without any direct input by 
Kosovars.18 Moreover, the constitutional framework specified that the SSRG would decide 
the parameters of budgetary and monetary policy.19 The SSRG convenes and presides over 
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the Economic and Fiscal Council (operated by Americans and Australians paid by USAID)20 
and appoints its international and Kosovar members. The SSRG appoints the international 
Auditor General, the international and Kosovar members of the Governing Board of the 
Banking and Payments Authority (acting as the central bank) and verifies the locally elected 
directors of the Customs Service and Tax Inspectorate. 
Paradoxically, the determination of external agencies (notably the OHR, USAID, the 
IMF and World Bank), to engineer BiH and Kosovo into peace and the good life has 
reproduced (and produced) social divisions rather than social cohesion, marked in Kosovo by 
the ethnic cleansing of March 1994. And such transformation that has occurred for reducing 
public space and public goods has been in partnership with, or connived at by, war 
entrepreneurs and local power brokers in a coincidence of interest.  
 In BiH elite adaptation to peace has ensured the continuation of nationalist 
appropriation. While military and paramilitary commandeering of spoils as part of the war 
economy ended, their embedded networks remained, for example, between Croat wartime 
militias that were controlled by soldiers and nationalists in Zagreb and Mostar. In each of the 
Croat and Bosniak areas of the Federation and the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska, the 
political organizations that took BiH into the war claimed control of resources in their ethno-
geographical sectors. in BiH, the ruling nationalist parties extended a post-war amnesty for 
deserters to include ‘economic crimes’ committed from the start of 1991 to the end of 1995, 
including the misuse of humanitarian aid. This immunized those politicians and wartime 
commanders who were otherwise vulnerable to investigation21 and enabled thousands of 
others to safeguard their wartime gains and to consolidate their economic control. Command 
and influence in the peacetime political economy could then be exerted through 
fragmentation of the public space through clientalism, rentier fraud, corporatism, and capture 
of privatisation processes. 
 Although initially resistant to legalized privatization and the spirit of transparency 
promoted by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), from 1998 onwards elites sought 
to gain control of privatization so that they could take advantage of donor funds that were 
conditional on withdrawing the state from the economy.22 A glaring example of ‘crony 
capitalism’ concerned the giant Mostar aluminium plant. In 1996, the Democratic Croat Union 
(Hrvatska Demokratske Zajednica – HDZ) took over the management of Aluminij Mostar, 
with a board led by Mijo Brajković. Although the plant suffered little war damage the 
management had it valued at US$84 million, compared to its pre-war value of US$620 
million. Its exports in the first year of revival exceeded its valuation by US$1 million. Brajković 
‘privatized’ it through a co-capitalization process, the shares going to the Croat workers and 
management. A team of international auditors found that illegalities had occurred, but ‘for 
political and practical reasons’ recommended that the ownership structure should remain 
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undisturbed. The Bosniac-dominated Federation government subsequently sought to re-
privatize it.23
In fact mechanisms introduced for distributing public assets, through voucher schemes, 
for example, were complex and vulnerable to corruption.24 The banking sector was 
particularly ripe for plucking, partly because the international financial institutions and donors 
first privatized the sector (through cash investments not vouchers) and then exerted pressure 
to reduce the burgeoning number of private banks. Jadranko Prlić, former Prime Minister of 
wartime Herceg-Bosna and Mostar tycoon had an empire estimated at US$1.3 billion and 
acquired a holding in Hrvatska Postanka Banka at a remarkably low price.25 Privredna Banka 
Sarajevo, a respected pre-war financial institution, was privatized via an offshore company in 
the Cayman Islands in 2004. Its true owners were a mystery and neither the FBiH 
Privatization Agency nor the FBiH Banking Agency could (or would) throw light on the 
matter.26  
A lack of industrial investment going back decades, the wartime loss of markets and a 
dislocated labour pool meant that many former public enterprises were already bankrupt. 
Complementary privatization strategies of the international agencies and the nationalist 
appropriators in BiH underpinned bankruptcy. International donors withheld support for public 
enterprises, and new nationalist managements engaged in asset stripping and undervaluing 
enterprises for sale. In RS, the Kristal Bank was sold for one euro to forestall liquidation by 
the Mladen Ivanić government without any attempt to estimate its value.27 And the indebted 
Banja Luka dairy was under threat of closure in a privatization process that would have left 
the city without milk. 28  
By 2004 the Federation government seemed caught between accelerating bankruptcies 
to write off losses and decelerating the resale of enterprises to protect the ‘new elite’, which, 
as Edhem Biber, president of the BiH Independent Syndicates’ Union, suggested, had 
‘gained plenty of property, created by workers’, for little outlay through share offers and the 
pre-war Marković privatisation.29  In January 2005 the Federation Prime Minister, Ahmet 
Hadzipasić, announced that privatization of key companies (Energopetrol, Energoinvest, 
Agrokomerc, KTK Visoko, Hidrogradnja, and the Mostar Tobacco Factory, for example) 
would be delayed, claiming that it was first necessary to improve the conditions for 
privatization.30 Hadzipasić maintained that the time was not right, there needed to be 
‘restructuring of mines and modernisation of thermal-energy capacities…investments in the 
telecommunication sector, solving of property-related issues…. I think the state is not mature 
enough to go into the privatisation in these sectors in the next two to three years.’31 
Paradoxically, the delay to some privatizations brought workers out on strike, for example at 
the Kamengrad coal mine near Sanski Most and the Tesanj UNICOFILTER company, 
because they had not received pay for months.32 By contrast a privatized Tuzla iron-casting 
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plant ceased production because of its debts, leaving 180 workers attempting to claim back-
pay and pension fund contributions, resulting in the canton revoking the privatization 
contract.33  
Indeed the progress of legislation to facilitate bankruptcy proceedings and to curb the 
money laundering, bribery and sleaze of privatization was marked by inadequate provision 
for the workers who were adversely affected by the process. The Federation government 
estimated that 10,000 workers would lose their jobs as a consequence of accelerated 
privatization and restructuring, but amendment of the bankruptcy law supposedly required 
trade union participation in planning social care for redundant workers of enterprises with a 
minimum of 51 per cent of state capital. Biber objected that the necessary funds for social 
protection were lacking, and when parliament amended the law in March 2004, miners 
staged a mass protest at the parliament building and Biber pledged to sue the government.34  
It was from rather different perspectives, then, that a consensus about the shambles 
had emerged by 2004: between proponents of privatisation; politicians who had failed to line 
their pockets; workers whose jobs were threatened; and non-nationalist elements in civil 
society. Donald Hays, the American Principal Deputy OHR in charge of economic 
transformation, and an unabashed zealot for privatization, announced that another name for 
it in BiH was ‘theft’, for which he blamed government authorities.35 The RS Prime Minister, 
Dragan Mikerević, bemoaned the slowness in implementing privatization, for which he 
blamed the international community.36  Biber, asserted that: ‘the principles of theft, corruption 
and immoral[ity]’ had characterized the process.37 The Sarajevo civil society group, Circle 99, 
concluded that privatization was a ‘dogma’ that had destroyed BiH companies, the economist 
Dragoljub Stojanov arguing that: ‘the only thing privatization made possible was robbery.’38  
The coincidence of anti-statist interests between an OHR seemingly obsessed with 
squeezing public economic space as a key to developing the liberal peace, and nationalist 
management elites anxious to hold on to the public space they had captured for private gain, 
diverged only in the methods by which the general population would be marginalized and 
workers excluded, community leaders engaging in varieties of blatant discrimination. The 
restrictions on the public sphere cannot be understood without taking into account the 
interplay between external actors and these domestic elites.  
In Kosovo, following the creation of a Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in 
December 2000, an UNMIK regulation (No. 2002/12 of May 2002) set up the Kosovo Trust 
Agency as the landlord and trustee of socially- and publicly- owned property. Exclusively 
under international control and operated by EU staff and USAID contractors, the Trust 
Agency, aims to ‘preserve or enhance the value, viability, and corporate governance of 
socially owned and public enterprises in Kosovo’. It does so by attempting to sell them off. 
The legal basis for this project is cloudy because constitutionally Kosovo is part of a state 
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which owns them, and the ownership of some state enterprises was forcibly taken over by 
KFOR (in the case of the Trepca complex) or by the KLA.  The initial goal was privatization 
500 companies, in the face of trade union and Belgrade’s opposition. Socially-owned 
enterprises have been operating at a third of capacity, employing 30,000 workers with 
another 30,000 on unpaid leave, out of Kosovo’s total employed labour force of 341,000.39 
Kosovar researchers have accused the DTI of unwittingly reinstating the badly 
malfunctioning self-management system of former Yugoslavia by reviving elected worker’s 
councils. In the absence of a DTI field presence to exert authority, the councils are 
permanently locked in disputes with self-appointed KLA strongmen who sell off stock and 
rent out premises to line their own pockets.40 According to its critics, the Trust Agency’s own 
lack of transparency adds to perceptions of corruption. It has also displayed limited 
understanding of the needs of the private sector for access to basic infrastucture and 
property titles, and it has been unable to tackle the essential prerequisite of reforming 
registry and ownership. Instead private enterprise has become parasitic on the ailing 
infrastructures of state industry.41  
Experts also consider that processes of privatization are prone to abuse and without 
safeguards could become a ‘de facto money laundering operation’.42 Indeed, there are 
concerns that privatization will follow a similar course to BiH.43 Former KLA fighters, including 
the Thaçi family, are prominent among the beneficiaries. In January 2000 UN police raided 
the apartment of Gani, Hashim’s elder brother and found 500,000 deutschmarks in cash, 
which he claimed had been paid to him for intermediary services by a Canadian construction 
firm working in Kosovo (through the firm’s director maintained the fee was in the region of 
only 120,000 deutschmarks).44 An example of Albanian Kosovars able to take advantage of 
international largesse to become one of the nouveau riche was Abdurrahman Konjufca. 
Dismissed from the state Shpendaria poultry administration as part of the Serbianisation 
process in 1990, Konjufca was able to invest US$1 million of development loans from USAID 
via the American Bank of Kosovo to gain control of the business after the war.45
 
Growth and Poverty 
 
Capturing and selling public assets for private profit had been determined by the external 
agencies as a key to economic growth, with the specific intention of attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI). But economic recovery was occurring too slowly in BiH to reach the 1991 
level before 2010, and in both BiH and Kosovo growth failed to reduce poverty. 
Ten years after Dayton, GDP per capita in BiH is only 50 per cent of the average for 
southeast Europe and still less than 50 per cent of its pre-war level (the official pre-war level 
being understated because it was accounting practice to exclude the service sector). The 
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real average annual growth rate fell markedly: from 10 percent in 1999, reaching a low of 3.5 
per cent in 2003, before recovering to an estimated 5 per cent in 2004–05 (see annex). 
Hopes for export-led growth have been stalled by the trade deficit equivalent to 36 per cent 
of GDP in 2003. The fiscal deficit has improved, but deficit financing is ruled out for BiH on 
ideological grounds, and because there is limited ability to attract FDI or to borrow from 
abroad.  
To some extent the protectors have cushioned the population from the rigours of 
neoliberalism by investing in public services; to some extent Kosovar Albanians have 
accepted the conditionalities of the peacebuilders as a means to secure independence. By 
the end of 2002 the population of 1.8 million had benefited from donor reconstruction aid 
worth €2 billion. Economic growth officially increased dramatically in the first two years after 
the war thanks to donor support, diaspora remittances and UNMIK spending on goods and 
services. The budget had considerable cash balances reflecting donor contributions, revenue 
gains from excise duties, the phasing in of income tax and strict rules on spending. In the 
absence of reliable official statistics, surveys indicated that per capita gdp had climbed 
significantly above the pre-conflict level. However, these calculations certainly 
underestimated the size of the pre-conflict GDP.46 Furthermore, only about 20% of post-
conflict GDP was domestically generated, the rest comprising foreign aid (50%) and 
remittances (30%).47  The economy remained one of the weakest in Europe and growth had 
slowed down by mid-2003.48 The economy was floating on aid. 
Receipts from privatization have been temporary, irregular and low (partly because 
asset stripping reduces the market value). Privatization of former state and socially-owned 
companies in Kosovo has failed to compensate for the liquidation of decrepit industries and 
loss of industrial employment.49 The Trust Agency put six up for tender in May 2003, but 
interest was weak, especially among foreign investors.50 In 2002, privatization in BiH yielded 
receipts amounting to only 1.3 per cent of GDP, and in 2003 the Federation Privatization 
Agency recorded a deficit of KM 2.3 million, partly because it failed to attract buyers for 
companies and partly because procedures were not completed in a satisfactory way.51 Only 
50 contracts were made with foreign buyers, and although net inflow doubled between 2001 
and 2002, the total stock of FDI had reached only 16 percent of GDP, half the level in 
Croatia.52 Most of it came from other parts of former Yugoslavia, Austria, Germany and 
Kuwait. The country’s Strategy for Economic Development (the poverty reduction strategy 
paper) of May 2004 aimed to attract US$2 billion in FDI and $1.5 in donor grants by the end 
of 2007.53
Even if this could be achieved, studies of reliance on foreign direct investment and 
privatization to stimulate economic growth suggest that productivity does not increase and 
benefits are heavily skewed towards entrepreneurs who take control of public enterprises.54  
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FDI appears to make little impact on growth, varying according to the level of repatriated 
profits, but increases the risk of instability in production and consumption because of the 
volatility of external investment. Moreover, economic deregulation and withdrawal of the state 
from the economy to tempt FDI contradicts the requirement for strong institutions of public 
authority to establish a social contract between society and the new state. 
 The dynamics of political economy that concern foreign investors, administrators and 
international financial institutions are: financial stringency to pay back loans; market 
penetration; cheap labour; and cheap exports. Monetarism in BiH brought inflation down to 
below 1 percent by 2002, but in a depleted land this was virtually a contribution to stagnation. 
The high cost of borrowing (over 10 per cent for business and individuals in 2002) has also 
smothered opportunities for growth. In addition, the effort accorded to attracting private 
sector investment has been inversely proportional to the attention paid to measures that 
might reduce the adverse social impacts of neoliberal policies. Poverty and unemployment, 
industrial and trade policy have been either neglected or treated as a kind of unavoidable 
collateral damage in the mission to make BiH profitable for investors. Poverty levels, income 
generation, employment opportunities, the cost of borrowing, social protection and the 
functionality of shadow economies do not figure highly, if at all. The World Bank and OHR 
could only wonder at the mystery of the demand for the convertible kaimark and invisible 
capital inflows apparently greater than annual FDI.55 This ‘excess liquidity’ in the economy 
clearly reflected a high dependence on cash transactions to facilitate services and exchange 
that could not be audited. In this respect, the shadow economy as well as the high proportion 
of government spending (20–30 per cent on welfare), although distorting in its budgetary 
impact, has been a cushion against even worse distress.  
Measurement of poverty and living standards is notoriously difficult, especially in BiH 
and Kosovo where data are unreliable. A living standards survey conducted in BiH in 2001 
indicated that 16 per cent of the population in the Federation and 25 per cent in RS were 
living below the poverty line. A further 30 percent were only just above the line and 
vulnerable to falling below it, and displaced persons in collective centres (who are among the 
poorest) were excluded from the survey.56 The UNDP’s ‘early warning survey’ for the spring 
of 2002 suggested that poverty was widespread, serious, and rising. Some 40–49 per cent in 
the Federation and 67–68 per cent in RS had insufficient income to cover a basic basket of 
consumer goods.57 One might reasonably surmise that the shadow labour market has been 
acting as a survival mechanism to enable people to exist at, or just above, the general 
poverty level. Without employment alternatives, deindustrialization has encouraged 
emigration, leading to depletion of skills and encouraged engagement in informal economic 
activity.  
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Dilemmas of Survival 
 
In response to various developmental crises, the IFIs have signalled general reforms to 
mitigate the harmful impacts of economic liberalization. It might even be argued that the 
Washington Consensus is dead.58 Nevertheless, modification, rather than a fundamental 
questioning of structural adjustment, has characterized the ‘liberal peace’ in southeast 
Europe.  
 
BiH 
In May 2000, the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for BiH included strengthening 
the social safety net. The Bank approved a US$14.6 million credit, repayable over 35 years, 
for educational development and welfare policies for the most vulnerable.59 However, this 
represented only about a third of the sum committed to merely managing the privatization 
process. Furthermore, the adoption of a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) in 2004, 
although supposedly driven by local conditions and requirements, and directed by local 
political ‘stakeholders’, was drafted with rigid budgetary and other macroeconomic rules by 
the ‘distant but omnipresent’ World Bank.60 PRSPs typially make little room for negotiation by 
local political elites. As such, the BiH Development/Poverty Reduction Strategy portrayed 
poverty reduction and employment as ancillary to the absolute necessity of enticing business 
and investment.61 The only new aspects of the strategy were designed to reinforce the 
neoliberal agenda: convergence towards EU integration through the Agreement on 
Stabilization and Association; integration into the global world economic space by attracting 
foreign investments; and membership of the WTO. Although there was reference to providing 
‘appropriate’ welfare, health, and educational systems, the PRSP contained no indication of 
the extent to which these sectors would be subject to market principles. Poverty was 
thoroughly profiled in the main section of the report, but curiously for a poverty reduction 
strategy, the vision statement mentioned poverty only briefly and contained virtually no 
employment or industrial policy.  
 A third of BiH respondents surveyed by the UNDP in the spring of 2002 cited 
unemployment as their chief concern.62 But employment creation has not exercised the 
external agencies unduly. In spite of the OHR’s introduction of a ‘Jobs and Justice’ 
programme in 2002, the working assumption was that there was excessive labour capacity 
and that social protection would follow market principles. This rationale peddled blatant 
dishonesty about the choices available. According to the Economic Reform Agenda agreed 
by the BiH authorities and instituted by the IMF, the World Bank and the EU: ‘Governments 
cannot create jobs. But they can create the conditions in which private enterprise can thrive 
and generate growth and with increased employment.’63 Obviously, governments can and do 
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create jobs, otherwise reforming officials would be out of work themselves.  
 The official BiH unemployment rate in 2003 was about 42 percent of the labour force 
and had been rising by about 1 per cent a year since 1999. However, this figure is 
misleading because evading the registration and taxation of labour became a major industry 
in itself. The IFIs assume a much lower rate on the grounds that over half the unemployed 
work in the shadow economy, and that the true rate was 16–20 per cent.64 Nevertheless, 
unemployment was still a significant drag on purchasing power and growth, and those 
officially employed do not necessarily get paid. The majority of the poor were employed 
people in families with children.65
 
Kosovo 
For reasons that may reflect the history of forcible protection by externals of Albanian 
interests, legal and constitutional difficulties in sequestering public ownership, and perhaps 
also criticism over the impact of neoliberalism in BiH, the EU’s 2002 Action Programme for 
Kosovo gave priority to the delivery of public services, institution building, public 
administration and socially-oriented projects.66 The UNDP emphasized employment 
generation through training programmes and social justice projects for ending ethnic and 
gender discrimination.67 The World Bank provided significant sums for social and public 
welfare and for poverty reduction through a Trust Fund.68 Together with the UNDP, the Bank 
also supported community initiatives for infrastructure rehabilitation and attempted to 
strengthen the income generation capacity of vulnerable rural families. Even the IMF 
proposed reform to facilitate long-term planning and stressed the need for investment in 
education, health and social policy.69 In Kosovo, therefore, public space has been squeezed 
less rigorously, though clearly divided between Serbs (with Belgrade’s protection) and 
Albanians. Several partners in economic restructuring have acknowledged the importance of 
social justice, and have undertaken investment in poverty reduction and public services. 
Owever, the social orientation in Kosovo was essentially cosmetic. In spite of faltering 
growth, declining diaspora remittances and foreign donations, high unemployment and falling 
purchasing power in 2002–03, the IMF presented its (long-discredited) structural adjustment 
model of fiscal stringency and deflationary curbs on government expenditure and 
consumption. IMF advisers welcomed curbs on consumption power and proposed further 
controls on wages, social welfare, public sector employment and on compensation for 
workers thrown out of work by privatization.70 In the last quarter of 2001, an estimated 50 per 
cent of the Kosovo population lived in poverty and 12 per cent in extreme poverty.71 In the 
first quarter of 2003 the unemployment rate was estimated at between 49 and 57 per cent 
(70 per cent among 16-24 year olds), and about 25 per cent of the population were 
registered as job seekers.72 Opinion surveys ranked unemployment and poverty among the 
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greatest problems facing Kosovo.73 These were not, however, the top priorities of the 
external agencies.  
By August 2003, USAID had contributed $200 million to Kosovo, of which $46 million 
was spent on ‘economic policy’, and a further $42 million on private sector development 
(including agriculture and a business support programme). However, these initiatives have 
provided little new employment; USAID’s substantial business support programme had 
created a grand total of 635 jobs by August 2003.74 About half of the Small and medium 
enterprises represent the restitution of traditional micro enterprises – the family or one-
person smallholdings, pizzerias and kiosks. The majority were barely surviving, let alone 
driving economic growth.75  
Little wonder that pettty economic crime, tax evasion, corruption, illegal employment, 
black marketeering and smuggling are considered to be widespread in both territories. 
According to Professor Rajko Tomaš, shadow economic activity added about 50% to the 
economy of the RS in the early years following Dayton. Nevertheless, research for the IMF 
and World Bank indicates that shadow economies and corruption appear to hinder economic 
growth, mainly by deterring investment and weakening government revenue potential.76
 
Criminality 
 
However, discussions of ‘crime’ tend to lack a nuanced understanding of its moral variations, 
its relationship to legitimate activities and the inadvertent role of external policies in its 
perpetuation. The negative perceptions and representations serve to distance the 
supposedly virtuous, law-abiding cores of capitalist democracy from phenomena that are 
categorized as threats to their social well-being. These same cores, and the international 
financial institutions (IFIs), are thereby exonerated from complicity in sustaining the demand 
for shadow activity. 
Economic ‘crime’ can be deconstructed into at least three varieties of ‘shadow 
economy’: organized mafia rackets and trafficking; corruption, fraud and nepotism in 
business and public life; and the coping or survival shadow economies (including black 
markets in employment and trade) of the population at large. Moral imperatives demand the 
elimination of crimes against the person, gang violence and trafficking in women and 
children. But the reliance of sectors of the population on mafia welfare and petty economic 
crime is at least in part, a function of impoverishment and the withdrawal of public safety 
nets, as well as drawing on traditions of economic organization that resisted the pressures of 
modern, centralized and audited economic exchange well before the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia.77
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The external agenda does little to suppress and divert shadow economies, and may 
well increase their grip. Privatization processes have brought benefits to some sectors. In 
BiH the Zenica complex has been sold to a foreign company with a contract that guarantees 
employment protection: this may indicate a change in direction. But the removal of the state 
from the economy reinforces reliance of the poor on the shadow coping and survival 
economies. The external actors claim to be building up state institutions, but deny the state a 
formative economic role in favour of private enterprise. They claim to be protecting individual 
rights, but deprive the poorest individuals of social protection and public space (or make 
them pay for it). The neoliberal agenda claims to promote economic growth, but entails 
monetarist policies that have a deflationary impact.78 Dealing with criminality involves greater 
controls and more policing but the failure to create jobs forces people to rely on shadow 
economic exchange. 
The effort accorded to social protection by the external actors has been consistently 
counteracted by the attention paid to introducing neoliberalism. In this context, shadow 
markets act as a survival mechanism, enabling people to exist at, or just above, the general 
poverty level.79  And this is the main paradox of economic survival in southeast Europe: 
policies that add to social stress and reliance on crime are legitimized, while economic 
survival through shadow economic activity is criminalized. Indeed south-east Europe’s 
political economies seem to have been archived as ‘criminalized’,80 and regional traffickers 
and corrupt political leaders have been held responsible by external peacebuilding agencies 
for resistance to economic modernisation and integration with the world economy. 81
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As Simon Chesterman argues, the means used by international civil administrations to reach 
the ends of are generally inconsistent, irrelevant or inadequate for the ends of human 
security.82 They are not, however, inconsistent with the thrust of liquid transformation which 
places priority not on local needs, employment and social protection, since the liberal agenda 
involves suppression of state-generated growth at the macro-level. On the contrary, in BiH, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq there has been a near paralysis of many public institutions and 
services: a form of asset stripping.  
These war-torn societies have limited say in the pace and direction of transformation. 
Bauman’s contention that power elites have no interest in the burdens of administration and 
management, welfare and ‘civilizing missions’ is not at all evident in these societies. 
According to Bauman, active engagement  in the life of subordinate populations is no longer 
needed but avoided as unnecessarily costly and ineffective’.83 It may transpire that the 
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external actors are rapidly losing their appetite for civilizing subordinate populations, either as 
a consequence of experience in southeast Europe or as a response to other unruly contexts. 
A much ‘lighter touch’ by peacebuilders was evident in Afghanistan than in BiH and Kosovo, 
and the Coalition in Iraq can be said to have attempted to exert control through centralized 
indirect rule. The external urge to engineer is often doomed to disappointment because the 
security situation is too risky, the market too small or the business context too alien. 
Nevertheless, in southeast Europe the war-torn societies have been vulnerable to raids on 
the public sphere from intervenors equipped with a neo-liberal agenda of political economy.  
Who does benefit? Since capitalism is about risk and speculation in the quest for 
market monopolies, then by definition mistakes and false assumptions about profitability are 
common. Foreign investors often meet disappointment in their effort to penetrate war-torn 
markets. But this is not persuasive evidence that a neoliberal agenda is being avoided. 
Investment failure may be underwritten by government guarantees. Other entrepreneurs 
make profits: security firms , insurance companies, foreign planners, consultants, experts 
and administrators. The post-Saddam political economy of Iraq may be an extreme example, 
but it is indicative of the neoliberal agenda that has been visited on war-torn societies 
elsewhere. In October 2003 half a dozen US graduates who could not speak Arabic and had 
never been to the Middle East took part charge of the Iraqi budget and the awarding of 
contracts. The friend of prominent US figures, Chalabi, secured US$40 million for his 
organisation from the US State Department and Department of Defense. Of the aid budgeted 
by Congress – US$18.4 billion – for the period before handing over to the interim 
government, only 2% had been spent. Yet Halliburton had secured $17 billion worth of 
contracts (much of it without competitive tender). Of the Iraq Development Fund, based on oil 
revenues, some $20 billion has gone missing, and half of it has funded contracts to 
externals. The fund was also raided to subsidise the US Embassy in Baghdad.  
 The political economy of liquid transformation is replete with contradictions. As 
Joseph Stiglitz remarks it is a case of do as the external engineers say – not as they do. The 
‘free market’ is not defined in the Kosovo constitution, other than in the vaguest terms about 
conformity to Euro-Atlantic standards). Perhaps this is because by most criteria, the external 
actors would themselves fail badly. The United States and EU subsidise agriculture, steel 
workers, arms manufacturers and dealers, technological development and the airline 
industry. The United States has a public deficit running into trillions of dollars. No US or EU 
farmer would tolerate BiH interest rates of 11%. The EU and other donors will not tolerate 
large public sector wage bills in southeast Europe, but has itself a public sector higher (at 
10.3% of GDP).  
No alternatives to the model are entertained, yet there are plenty of examples of 
dirigisme, which appear to have nursed vulnerable societies through difficult times: France, 
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Sweden, Cuba, Asian states (including Vietnam which recovered from war quicker than 
Cambodia). Investment in public goods, infrastructure, social welfare systems and public 
employment may be necessary to help redress a situation in which a few individuals flaunt 
obscene affluence but public facilities are often squalid. Such dirigisme may entail controls 
and a degree of political authoritarianism every bit as irksome as that employed by the OHR 
and UNMIK. But a strong and active state role in planning and implementation,84 with 
expansionist policies to increase employment, income generation and consumption power to 
wean vulnerable people off illegal activity through investment in public services and social 
protection, may be less dysfunctional that the neoliberal model.  
 This paper concludes that the case of war-torn societies supports Bauman’s depiction 
of liquid transformation in the reduction of public spheres. But it has also contended that for 
southeast Europe this has not been an organic process based in local cultures of political 
economy, but an aggressive social engineering, in which regional war elites have been 
willing participants in diminishing the public space. In Kosovo, for example, the protectorate 
powers allowed no debate on the most appropriate economic systems to foster. NATO 
members went to war with an economic strategy already cast, and the EU and the 
international financial institutions were delegated a completely free hand to impose it. 
Consequently, the UNMIK and associated authorities have ultimate control over finance and 
budgets; there has been limited transfer of ownership over economic policy.  
The strategy in southeast Europe may be summarized as macroeconomic stability to 
promote investor confidence, and the use of public money derived from the public revenues 
of aid donor countries to subsidize private capital acquisition and investment for profit. The 
intention may be not only to achieve macro-economic stability, install a free enterprise culture 
and make BiH and Kosovo safe for foreign investment. Given concerns about organized 
crime, corruption and the shadow economies, the OHR and UNMIK have exercised some 
caution in relinquishing the levers of the economy to local leaders and have invested in a 
degree of social protection. But it has also meant that a meaningful role in economic 
decisions is denied to civil society and it is difficult for the populations to hold local politicians 
responsible for the country’s economic welfare. This may be justifiable in so far as civil 
society is likely to have limited influence on economic policy, but it also seems to be the case 
that the international protectors define civil society in the narrow terms reminiscent of Adam 
Smith, as private enterprise to be given every assistance to counter the economic claims of 
the rest of civil society. Moreover, the international protectors seem to discount the extent to 
which an imported economic model, especially if rigorously imposed, reinforces the need for 
communities to protect themselves from the adverse impacts of neoliberalism and to spend 
on public projects.85
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The implication for the politics of the region is profound. An emphasis on 
‘individualization’ has the effect of detracting from, and camouflaging, the structures of power 
that canalize the processes of modernization. Economic power is no longer exerted from a 
territorial base or from the commanding heights of a national economy. As Robert Cox notes, 
whereas the right of self-assertion is celebrated, in a social and economic context the 
individual’s capacity to exert control over the systemic factors that determine its 
implementation is removed. Consequently, just as in one-party, authoritarian regimes, politics 
is about depoliticizing people, by removing the economic determinants of everyday 
conditions from political control. Politics becomes irrelevant: ‘[t]he sense of civic efficacy is 
removed; and many people, the most disadvantaged, are left in the futility of alienation.’86 In 
southeast Europe this process seems rather more complex. The meaningful function of 
formal politics, to protect group interests from other groups, had an impact in high levels of 
participation and voter turn-out. But it may be increasingly the case that depoliticization is 
occurring, not simply because economic reforms are removing a key interest in participation, 
but because the populations have not been effectively re-politicized in the sense of 
controlling formal ‘state’ politics – as a consequence of external governance. For example, in 
their own lack of transparency and accountability, the OHR and UNMIK have been widely-
perceived as a sorry exemplar of institution building. The mission to Kosovo has lacked 
knowledge about the local legal system, shown insufficient respect for local traditions and 
marginalized locally-elected representatives in terms of policy input. By 2003, the 
unaccountable international agencies were reportedly losing respect.87
Dependence on governmental support to private enterprise also contradicts the 
neoliberal ideology of the free market that the external agencies claim to represent and 
reproduce. In addition, it may be seriously doubted whether subsidizing business generates 
strong public institutions and economic growth in post-conflict contexts. Privatization is likely 
to further reward the war entrepreneurs who claimed the spoils of peace. At the same time, 
the neoliberal economic model inhibits the prospects for legitimate work, taxable economic 
exchange and an increase in consumption power. In the absence of alternative sources of 
income generation, dependence on shadow activity has therefore been a necessity for many 
workers and their families. As Bauman remarks, it is the job of critical thought ‘to bring into 
light the many obstacles piled on the road to emancipation’.88 His dimensions of liquid 
modernity are by no means all apparent in southeast Europe. But both the neoliberal and 
local carpetbaggers have created impediments to emancipation in their quest to engineer 
liquid transformation in the region. 
♦[Annex follows the Notes] 
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♦ Table 1: BiH Economic and Financial Indicators 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Indicators                   1990         1999       2000       2001     2002      2003    2004*  2005* 
GDP ($US m.)         10,633**   4,540      4,252       4,795      5,610 
GDP per cap,  
current prices ($US)  2,429**   1,135      1,093      1,222 
FBiH     1,458      1,373      1,453 
RS         821         806         873 
 
Real GDP growth %  
(i.e. allowing for inflation 
but not shadow activity) BiH     9.9          5.5         4.4       5.5      3.5   5.0  5.5 
FBiH                    9.5          7.0         7.0 
RS      11.3          2.6         1.9 
 
Industrial output 
FBiH     11.0           8.8      12.2       9.2      4.8   14.0   7.0          
RS        2.0           5.3    –12.9     –2.5      5.8    8.0   6.0  
 
Consumer price yearly  
average % change     
FBiH                 –1.0            1.4        2.1       1.0         0.6        0.2      1.8 
RS     14.0          14.0        7.0           1.7         1.9        2.2      2.2 
Budget Balance (% of  GDP)     –             –7.0   –3.3     –2.2  
      0.4      –0.1      0.0      
Recorded unemployment   
(% labour force) BiH –       –     –      40.9     42.0 
FBiH   –      38.9     39.9      42.7     44.0    
RS    –      40.2     38.5      36.5     37.0          
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notse: *Forecast. **Service sector was excluded in Yugoslav GDP accounts. Source: Dragoljub Stojanov, 
‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’, forum for Albania, BiH and FR Yugoslavia, Policy Notes, November 
2002; European Commission, European Economy: The Western Balkans in Transition, Occasional Paper 
no.1, DGA Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, January 2003; Bank Austria Creditanstalt, CEE 
Report, 4, 2004. 
 
Table 2: South-east Europe Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment  (€ million) 
______________________________________________________________________ 
          BiH  Croatia          Slovenia Serbia & Mont.   Macedonia  
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
2005*       320 
2004*       310 
2003       340 
2002       275  750**              390**          300**   75** 
2001       133     470              385          200 350 
2000            158      827              110            25 169 
1999        90               1,445              144          112   27 
 
Population        3.8m               4.5m               2m        11.4m  2m 
 
FDI (€ per cap.   
in 2002)        230              1,900            2,600                200 500 
Notes: *Forecast. **Approximate. Source: Bank Austria Creditanstalt, CEE Report, 4, 2004 (available at: 
www.ba-ca.com). 
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